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Learning to map source code to software
vulnerability using code-as-a-graph
Abstract—We explore the applicability of Graph Neural Net-
works in learning the nuances of source code from a security
perspective. Specifically, whether signatures of vulnerabilities in
source code can be learned from its graph representation, in
terms of relationships between nodes and edges. We create a
pipeline we call AI4VA, which first encodes a sample source
code into a Code Property Graph. The extracted graph is then
vectorized in a manner which preserves its semantic information.
A Gated Graph Neural Network is then trained using several
such graphs to automatically extract templates differentiating
the graph of a vulnerable sample from a healthy one. Our model
outperforms static analyzers, classic machine learning, as well as
CNN and RNN-based deep learning models on two of the three
datasets we experiment with. We thus show that a code-as-graph
encoding is more meaningful for vulnerability detection than
existing code-as-photo and linear sequence encoding approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore the applicability of Graph Neu-
ral Networks in understanding source code nuances, from
a security perspective. We focus on code written in the C
programming language. Source code naturally lends itself to
a graph model in several forms such as abstract syntax tree,
control flow graph, data dependency graph, etc. We explore
whether it is possible for a neural network to understand
the relationships between the different nodes and edges of a
source code graph, and further, if it is possible to automatically
extract (learn) certain templates of these relationships. If this
is possible, then using the principle of graph isomorphism,
perhaps these templates can be matched across unseen source
code graphs to uncover its properties.
We take the example of vulnerability detection in code to
drive this study. Existing rule-based approaches to vulnera-
bility detection, both in static and dynamic analysis, suffer
from shortcomings which a learning-based approach may help
alleviate (Section 2). In the deep learning domain, Graph
neural networks [34] have been shown to be useful in tasks
such as logic reasoning and program invariant inferencing
[21], code categorization [38], and code variable prediction
[11], which makes it intriguing to test their efficacy in source
code level bug-finding. Furthermore, Yamaguchi et al. [39]
have shown that manually-created vulnerability-specific graph-
level templates are useful in searching for similar instances
elsewhere in a project. Thus, we wish to combine the two
approaches to see if neural networks can help automate the
bug-finding process. This automated template-matching would
then hopefully augment the existing static and dynamic anal-
ysis approaches, thereby resulting in a more effective secure
code pipeline.
In this work, we perform supervised learning over labeled
(buggy/clean) C functions. The idea is that since code has
structure it can potentially be used to figure out if certain part
of the code structure is related to specific vulnerability types.
To this end, we first convert code to to a comprehensive graph
representation called the Code Property Graph (CPG) [39].
Next, we encode the graph to a vector representation using
Word2Vec [28] while preserving its semantic properties. The
code graph vector is fed to a graph neural network, which
learns the signature of bugs in terms of relationships between
nodes and edges of the code’s CPG.
Existing source-code-level learning-based approaches for
vulnerability detection treat code as a picture or as a linear
sequence of tokens. The pixel signals from such a picture are
then extracted using Convolutional Neural Networks which
have been shown to perform very well in the image processing
domain [20]. Alternatively, temporal signals from the linear
sequence encoding are extracted using Recurrent Neural Net-
works or their variants [23], [30]. We believe that a code-as-
graph representation carries more meaningful signals that can
be exploited for better vulnerability detection. For example,
absence of a ‘variable sanitization template’ [39], i.e. value-
range validation prior to being used as a memory allocation
size argument, may indicate a potential buffer overflow vulner-
ability. This template can potentially be automatically learnt
in terms of control-flow and data-dependency relationship
between locations of interest in source code (i.e. edge connec-
tivity between nodes of a graph). We explore this hypothesis
in this work 1.
In addition to the comparison between the effectiveness of
different source code encoding approaches in learning code-
to-vulnerability mappings, we also share certain insights we
gathered in this work. Specifically, as expected, classifying
code into vulnerable or not turned out to be hard on real-world
(noisy) data as opposed to synthetic (clean) data. Furthermore,
per-project classifiers were much more accurate than a uni-
versal classifier across multiple real-world projects. Similarly,
learning vulnerability-specific models was easier than a global
model across all vulnerabilities.
We present quantitative evidence of these observations in
SectionIV. We experimented with different datasets namely
Draper [25], Juliet [29] and s-bAbI [36]. We used the Gated
Graph Neural Network(GGNN) [21] to perform graph-level
1There is another avenue of treating code-as-natural-language, where
approaches such as BERT which have shown great promise in the NLP domain
can be put to use. We are still exploring this dimension of code representation
and do not compare with it in this work.
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Fig. 1. AI4VA Pipeline
learning on the code snippets in these datasets. The GGNN
model performed very well in the s-bAbI and Juliet datasets,
achieving an F1 score of 0.99 and 0.87 respectively, and an
average precision of 0.99 and 0.96 respectively. The results on
the more complex Draper dataset was average with a 0.5 F1
score and 0.4 AP.
II. DESIGN
In this work, we focus at source code at a function-level.
Given a C function the goal of our tool is to classify it as
being vulnerable or not. We leave the task of localizing the
bug for future work.
Different approaches have different ways of detecting vul-
nerabilities in code, such as (i) rules of a static analyzer, (ii)
templates as in [39], and (iii) actual code execution and ex-
ploration as in fuzzers and dynamic analysis. It can be tedious
and error-prone to have to create and maintain explicit rules
and templates for different languages. That is perhaps why we
see so many False Positives (code tagged as being vulnerable
but isn’t so) from static analyzers, causing developer fatigue
in having to sift for True Positives (code tagged as being
vulnerable and is indeed so) amongst numerous alerts of a
static analyzer. On the other hand, having to compile and
execute code and then hunt for specific inputs that can trigger
a vulnerability, as in dynamic analysis, is very time consuming
and lacks completeness.
In contrast, we wish to explore whether it is possible to learn
such code-to-vulnerability mapping heuristics automatically.
The idea is pretty straightforward–presenting a large dataset
of tagged examples (vulnerable, not-vulnerable) to a learning-
based model so that it can figure out the properties which dif-
ferentiate vulnerable from healthy code. The learned heuristics
from such a macroscopic approach to vulnerability detection
can then augment the microscopic approach of static analyzers.
The end result is a more finely curated set of alerts to the
developer to aid in secure code development with hopefully
lesser False Positives.
Figure 1 shows our AI4VA2 pipeline which takes in raw
source code and classifies it as being vulnerable or not. It
consists of the following 4 stages:
A. Dataset Acquisition
As in any learning-based study, access to a high quality
dataset is quintessential. For our use-case we need a well-
labeled source of C functions. Fortunately, a few of these are
publicly available and we use 3 such datasets in our study:
Draper [25], Juliet [29] and S-babi [36]. Out of these, S-
babi and Juliet are synthetic datasets whereas Draper also
2Short for ‘Artificial Intelligence For Vulnerability Analysis’
Fig. 2. A C function suffering from a buffer overflow vulnerability in the
last line.
contains source code from the wild, specifically from Debian
and Github projects. We test with multiple datasets to see how
well a learning-based tool fairs when the dataset’s signal vs.
noise content varies.
B. Code Representation
We do not perform an explicit feature extraction step in our
AI4VA pipeline in contrast with classical Machine Learning
(ML) approaches. This means we do not have to convert code
into features such as number of lines, conditionals, identifiers
and library-calls, cyclomatic complexity, Halstead complexity,
call-stack depth, and the like. The Deep Learning models
of today are capable of automatic feature extraction. So we
focus on converting code into a representation amenable for
consumption by Neural Networks, whilst preserving semantic
information from the code.
Some existing approaches to code based vulnerability detec-
tion treat source code as photos, and then try to extract pixel
signals from it using Convolutional Neural Network models
from the image domain [20]. While others treat code as a
sequence of tokens and try to extract temporal signals using
Feedforward or Recurrent Neural Networks and its variants
[23], [30]. In this work, we focus on the graph nature of source
code which we feel is a more natural representation of code,
encapsulating semantically rich information.
We use Code Property Graphs (CPGs) [39] to represent
source code. A CPG is essentially a combination of the
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), the Control Flow Graph (CFG),
and the Program Dependency Graph (PDG) extracted from
source code. A C function is essentially converted into a
graph containing different kind of nodes and edges conveying
different kind of information. In particular, its syntax informa-
tion is captured by the AST. For example, the nodes and the
black (solid) edges in Figure 3 represent its AST. While AST
models the structures of the function, it is insufficient to reason
about program behavior without understanding the semantics
of the structures on AST. To this end, semantic information
is annotated atop AST, which represents the data flow and
control flow information. For example, the blue (dash-dot)
edge with tag “D a” in Figure 3 shows the data dependency
from the sub-tree that defines the variable a to the sub-tree
that uses the defined value (a Use-Def edge). Similarly, the
green (dashed) edges capture the execution order such as
conditional branches. In this way, we can encode both syntax
and semantics without losing any information.
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Fig. 3. A CPG for the code shown in Figure 2, simplified as per [39]. Edge-type legend: Black (solid) = AST, Green (dotted) = CFG, Blue (dash+dot) =
PDG. Joern actually produces a more detailed CPG with almost twice as many nodes and edges as shown here.
Fig. 4. Output generated by Joern for the function shown in Figure 2. Shown
is a list of CPG nodes and edges, indexed by node IDs.
We use the Joern open-source tool [17] to convert each
sample from the dataset into its corresponding CPG. The CPG
shown in Figure 3, for the code snippet from Figure 2, is a
simplified version of the actual CPG which Joern generates.
Figure 4 shows Joern’s output in terms of a list of nodes and
edges.
The set of edges for the CPGs in our target datasets
consist of the following 12 edge types: IS CLASS OF, IS -
FUNCTION OF AST, IS FUNCTION OF CFG, IS AST -
PARENT, USE, DEF, DOM, POST DOM, CONTROLS, DE-
CLARES, FLOWS TO and REACHES. We preserve the edge
type information in the CPG representation of each sample
of the dataset. As described in Stage 4, we chose a Neural
Network model that respects and learns the properties and im-
portance of these edge types in mapping code-to-vulnerability.
C. Vectorization
This stage is necessary to convert human-readable CPG
representation of code samples into a vector representation
consumable by Neural Networks. An edge is converted to
a tuple {source node id, edge type, dest node id}. Tuples
belonging to all edges in a CPG are then consumed by the
Fig. 5. Word2vec vector representation for C tokens preserves their semantic
relationship. Shown here are tokens ‘similar’ to a target based upon Word2vec
similarity   0.5. As can be seen, Word2Vec picks up some weird nuances
from the dataset such as the similarity between ‘+’ and ‘2’, and between
‘malloc’ and ‘atoi’
graph neural network model (Stage 4) to create adjacency
matrices per edge-type.
Each node is converted to a N-dimensional vector. A
node can contain a variety of information depending upon
its source- AST, CFG, PDG. It can contain C keywords
(int, for), library function names (malloc, sprintf),
operators (+, =), and identifiers (’a’, ’foo’). In addition, it can
also contain CPG node type identifiers such as IdentifierDe-
clStatement, AssignmentExpression etc. as shown in Figure 4.
One approach is to randomly assign the nodes N-dimensional
representations via one-hot encoding—a dimension for each
token, represented with a ‘1’ if the token exists in the node
and ‘0’ otherwise. Such random assignment results in loss
of meaningful information. For example, the assigned vector
representations of ‘0’ and ‘1’ might not reflect their integer
relationship. To preserve these semantic attributes of the code
and the language, we use Word2vec [28] to encode each token
as an N-dimensional vector. As shown in Figure 5, inspired
by [20], the vector representations of the digits is closer to
each other, representing their semantic similarity, and distant
from say that of memcpy and memset (themselves closer
in encoding representing their memory allocation behavior
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similarity).
All identifiers are mapped to a generic ‘ID’ token, since
they’ll be different for different samples. An identifier a in a
sample may not be the same a in another sample. We do not
want to learn how the token named a relates to a vulnerability
in the code, so we remove this noise by normalizing it to ‘ID’.
We still preserve it’s signal by virtue of edge connections of
this node to other CPG nodes.
Non-leaf nodes in a CPG are represented by the N-
dimensional vector of their CPG node type. We discard the
code attribute associated with such nodes since it’s compo-
nents eventually get repeated in the child nodes (see Figure 4).
For leaf nodes, we experiment with two different node repre-
sentations: (i) average, and (ii) concatenation of the vectors
corresponding to the CPG node type and the individual tokens
of the node’s code attribute.
D. Learning
We base our learning phase on the hypothesis that that since
there exists an inherent structure to code, it should be possible
to exploit it to automatically figure out if certain part of the
code structure is related to specific vulnerability types.
By this stage, a C function has been converted to a CPG
and appropriately vectorized. Furthermore, a good amount of
structural and semantic information contained in the code has
been preserved in the process. We are now ready to learn
the abstract signatures of bugs or vulnerabilities in terms of
relationships between nodes and edges of the code’s CPG.
We use a state-of-the-art neural network that has the ability
to operate on graph inputs- Gated Graph Neural Network [21].
It operates by transferring information from adjacent nodes
over the connecting edges and aggregating such information
at each node. Such exchange of information is repeated for a
certain number of steps, with retention of old and assimilation
of new information governed via Gated Recurrent Units- a
successor to Recurrent Neural Networks. A final classification
layer maps the information accumulated at each node to its
individual confidence in signaling a vulnerable or healthy
verdict for its parent CPG (or equivalently the code sample). A
combination of confidence values across all nodes of a CPG is
the final confidence value the model assigns to its vulnerability
prediction per sample.
Each node’s vector representation acts as the initial infor-
mation it carries. A weighted sum of information flowing from
its immediate neighbors is the new incoming information per
node. During the process of training, the model learns the
values of weights to assign to different nodes and edges, de-
pending upon their contribution to information flow resulting
in correct vulnerable or healthy signals across samples.
III. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The goal of the experiments is to classify a given C function
as being vulnerable or not. We compare the classification
performance of our AI4VA pipeline with existing approaches,
in terms of F1 and precision/recall scores: (i) Deep Learning
Models: CNN and RNN from [31], Memory Networks from
[14], (ii) A classical Machine Learning model–Bag-of-Words
+ RandomForest–from [31]. (iii) Static analyzers, with their
scores borrowed from [31], [36]
Testbed: Experiments were performed on a 160 core 3.6GHz
PowerNV 8335-GTB machine with 506GB RAM and 4 Tesla
P100-SXM2-16GB GPUs. The software stack includes RHEL-
7.6 host OS, NVIDIA driver 418.67, CUDA 10.1, python 3.6,
and tensorflow 1.13.1.
A. Datasets
Here we present some salient features of the datasets we
experimented with. All datasets were run through the AI4VA
pipeline separately. The train:validate:test split was 80:10:10.
1. Juliet : The Juliet Test Suite [29] contains synthetic code
examples with vulnerabilities from 118 different Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [15]classes designed for test-
ing static analyzers. From its 64K test cases we extract 200K
functions, amongst which almost 25% are vulnerable. Samples
tagged as ’bad’ are labeled as 1, and the ones with a ’good’
tags are labeled as 0.
2. Draper : The Draper dataset [25] consists of 1.27 mil-
lion C/C++ functions across synthetic (Juliet, as above) as
well as real-world Debian and Github projects. It has been
labeled by running each code sample through multiple static
analyzers, followed by manual verification, de-duplication,
and categorization into 5 different vulnerability categories:
CWE-119, CWE-120, CWE-469, CWE-476, and OTHERS
(all other CWEs combined). It is a highly imbalanced dataset
with only ¡10% samples being vulnerable. When not doing
per-vulnerability training (Section IV-Csec-pervuln)), samples
with any CWE tags are labeled as 1, rest as 0.
3. s-bAbI : The authors of s-bAbI [36] claim that the Juliet
dataset is far too small and complex to use in learning to
predict the labeled security defects. Their synthetic dataset
contains syntactically-valid C programs with non-trivial con-
trol flow, focusing solely on the buffer overflow vulnerability
(CWE-120). Although s-bAbI is simple as compared to real-
world code, static analyzers exhibit poor recall on it. We used
the s-bAbI generator to create a balanced dataset of almost
475K functions. Samples with a ’UNSAFE’ tag are labeled as
1, and those with ’SAFE’ as 0.
B. GGNN Model Configuration
We used the GGNN implementation available at [27] to
which we added a classification layer together with cross en-
tropy loss function. In addition to the regular hyper-parameter
tuning, we experimented with a variety of model configura-
tions such as:
1) Calculating the graph’s vulnerability verdict using (i) sum
of confidences per node, (ii) average of confidences per
node, and (iii) confidence values of a master per-graph
node added to accumulate signals from all of the graph
nodes
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2) Learning node importance at a per-class level or in an
absolute sense in terms of contributing to the overall
graph verdict
3) Learning the importance of edges in terms of propagating
discriminatory signals
Wherever necessary, measures were taken to tackle class
imbalance such as:
1) Giving more weights to vulnerable class during loss
minimization while training.
2) Using focal loss [24] instead of cross-entropy loss.
3) Ensuring batch shuffling maintains class ratio.
4) Training with more balanced data splits.
Results presented in the next Section are for the best per-
forming configuration per dataset. The performance difference
with different configurations is more incremental than extreme.
The following model configuration worked across the board:
node feature vector size = 32, learning rate = 0.001, batch
size = 100000 nodes (max nodes per graph = 699), GRU
hidden size = 100, number of GRU unrolling timesteps = 5,
GRU activation function = tanh, optimizer = Adam, dropout
keep prob = 0.8.
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS
We group our findings into following 3 categories:
1) Data Source: Real-world vs. Synthetic
2) Encoding: Code-as-graph vs. Others
3) Classifier’s Vulnerability Scope: Generic vs. Specific
A. Data Source: Real-world vs. Synthetic
Table 6 compares the performance of different vulnerability
detection approaches on the three datasets. As can be seen,
performance of the approaches drops across the board when
going from a clean but narrow-scope synthetic dataset (s-
bAbI) to a noisy but real-world dataset (Draper). Although the
trend is as per expectations but the performance drop is rather
extreme, going from almost perfect scores to as good as merely
a coin-toss! For both s-bAbI and Juliet, GGNN beats the
competition. Although the Frama-C static analyzer performs
quite well on s-bAbI, it should be notes that the scores shown
are on a ‘sound’ subset of s-bAbI. On the full dataset even
Frama-C’s score drops to a 0.85 F1, while GGNN’s score
remain the same (0.99).
Summary: Classifying code into vulnerable or not is hard on
real-world (noisy) data as opposed to synthetic (clean) data,
for both static analyzers and ML/AI approaches alike.
B. Encoding: Code-as-graph vs. Others
For the synthetic Juliet dataset (Table 6(b)), GGNN per-
forms better than RNN and CNN (True for both published
as well as reproduced results). One reason this might happen,
and this was also our hypothesis, is because more meaningful
information about code syntax and semantics is preserved in
a code-as-graph representation. A GGNN which is able to
operate on graph structures is able to then propagate and
learn differentiating signals about how the code structure of
a vulnerable program differs from that of a healthy one.
Fig. 6. Source-code vulnerability classification performance across 3 datasets:
(a) s-bAbI (sound subset), (b) Juliet, and (c) Draper (== Juliet + Debian
+ Github). Comparison of our GGNN-over-AI4VA approach against static
analyzers (Clang sa, Cppcheck, Frama-C and Flawfinder), classical ML
and Deep Learning approaches. Different metrics are shown in different
tables based upon the published work from where the competitor scores are
borrowed. Legend: PR AUC: Are under the Precision-Recall curve, BoW:
Bag-of-Words, RF: Random Forest, Clang sa: Clang Static Analyzer. Two
F1 values are shown for both Cppcheck and Clang sa static analyzers based
upon different values reported by [36] and [31].
Verification of this hypothesis, in terms of interpreting what
code structure (nodes and edges in the code graph) influences
the classifiers decision, is part of our planned future work.
In case of the Draper dataset, however, we cannot directly
compare GGNN scores to those of CNN, since the published
results [31] are for two Draper subsets- (i) Juliet-only, and
(ii) Github + Debian, instead of all of them combined (i.e.
full Draper). When we reproduce3 the CNN results on the full
Draper dataset (last two rows of Table 6(c)), we see slightly
lower scores than for its two subsets individually. However, in
this case the CNN edges past GGNN (the latter having been
modeled only for CWE-119 and CWE-120 vulnerabilities, but
better performance not expected with further modeling). There
are a few things of note here.
1) The fact that scores for the full Draper dataset (CNN
F1=0.53) are slightly lower than those of its two con-
stituent subsets (CNN F1=0.84,0.54) might indicate a
problem in combining the differentiating features of syn-
thetic and real-world code.
3When we reproduced the CNN+RF model on the full Draper dataset,
we got much lower scores (F1=0.35) than the ones published for the two
Draper subsets (F1=0.82,0.56). We have contacted the authors and are awaiting
resolution.
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2) The mismatch of a code-as-photo encoding may also be
noticed in Table 6(c), where learning with the neural
features alone (CNN over pure ’code pixel signals’) per-
formed worse than when combined with a RandomForest
classifier (CNN + RF) as in [31]. Similarly for RNN +
RF, omitted in the table.
3) The scores for the Draper dataset however are so low
that a comparison is effectively meaningless. The fact that
none of ClassicML, CNN, and GGNN are able to perform
much better than a coin-toss may indicate a potential
problem with the dataset, in terms of its ability to provide
differentiating features (noise vs. signal). The noise can
perhaps be decreased by operating on slices [22]. Explor-
ing GGNN effectiveness over CPGs of program slices is
another of our future work items.
4) On the other hand, low classification scores across the
board may also be symptomatic of the way ground truth
labels are collected for Draper, based upon the outputs of
static analyzers. We are also looking into alternate sources
for generating cleaner data with more trustworthy labels.
Summary: Treating code as a graph (e.g. AST, CFG, PDG)
is beneficial than treating code as a photo or a linear
sequence, from an automated learning perspective.
C. Classifier’s Vulnerability Scope: Generic vs. Specific
sec-pervuln) Since Draper was a particularly challenging
dataset, we explored different ways to improve classification
performance over it. One of the configurations we tried was
to create per-vulnerability models trained only with examples
containing the same vulnerability type, instead of a global
model trained on all vulnerability types together. We saw
promising results in terms of a 52% - 93% increase in accu-
racy across per-vulnerability models, when using a relatively
balanced dataset with a 2:1 non-vulnerable:vulnerable sample
ratio. In this setting, instead of classifying a test sample as
being vulnerable or not, the methodology would be to run it
past individual models and classify it as being susceptible or
not to a particular CWE.
Summary: Learning vulnerability-specific models is easier
than a global model across all vulnerabilities.
V. RELATED WORK
Traditional approaches to software vulnerability detection
can be largely grouped into the categories of static analyses
and dynamic analyses [16]. Static analysis tools, such as
the Clang static analyzer [2] and Infer [4], typically build
a model of program states and reason over all possible
behaviors that might happen in the real execution. However,
since there are too many possible executions and behaviors,
it’s usually infeasible to consider all possibilities. Therefore,
static analyses in practice usually abstract away some details,
lose information and hence produce false positives. For rule-
based static analyses, such as linters [1] and taint analysis
tools [3], the results depend on the coverage of the defect
types and the quality of the rules. It’s possible that false
negatives can be observed. By contrast, dynamic analyses
execute the program and observe the execution behaviors.
Testing, symbolic execution, concolic testing and fuzzing [5]–
[8], [13], [35] are commonly used for this purpose. While it
can concretely expose the defects in the execution, it requires
a precise input that can drive the execution to the places
of interests. Unfortunately, it’s usually challenging to prepare
inputs that achieve either good program coverages or satisfying
the particular path conditions.
To help alleviate some of these issues with traditional
approaches we look towards ML/AI approaches. Since the
latter have improved the state of the art in NLP tasks and since
code also has a language-like ’naturalness’ to it [10], perhaps
even more structured than natural language, we hypothesized it
would be worth exploring learning-based approaches to source
code vulnerability analysis which respect its natural structure.
We base our work primarily on Code Property Graphs
(CPG) introduced by Yamaguchi et al. [39], and Gated Graph
Neural Networks proposed by Li et al. [21]. The former
proposed the idea of using manually created templates for soft-
ware vulnerabilities for graph traversals on a union (==CPG)
of the code’s AST, CFG and PDG graphs. And the latter
optimizes Graph Neural Networks [34] to extract features from
graph-structured inputs, and use it to solve tasks such as logic
reasoning, path finding, and program invariant inferencing.
We combine both of these approaches to automatically learn
signatures of vulnerabilities in source code.
From a security perspective, several machine learning app-
roaches have been developed to learn differentiating signals
from explicit code features for software vulnerability detection
or code quality evaluation. These tend to learn from source
code features such as number of lines or conditional state-
ments, use of sensitive library functions or system calls, call-
stack depth, complexity measures like cyclomatic or Halstead
complexity, etc. [9], [18], [19], [26], [33], [37]. This can be
augmented with meta features such as commit messages and
bug reports [32], [40]. Alternatively, deep learning approaches
automatically extract signals from code by treating it as a
photo or a linear sequence [14], [20], [22], [23], [30], [31]. We
believe more meaningful signals are preserved in a graph-level
encoding of source code and thus experiment with a code-as-
a-graph representation.
From an encoding perspective, recent work has also looked
into deep learning over code-as-graph as in [11], [12], [38].
[38] uses Graph Neural Network based auto-encoders for
unsupervised learning over source code ASTs to automatically
cluster Java classes into different categories- business logic,
interface, and utility classes. [11] also uses Gated Graph
Neural Networks, and targets learning lower / fundamental
levels of program structures such as predicting variable names
given its usage, or correct variable selection given a program
location. Similarly, code2vec [12] uses a collection of path-
contexts (AST paths + leaf-node values) to encode source
code, and use an attention-based neural network to learn
appropriate names for a function from its code. On the other
hand, we operate at a macroscopic level of automatically
learning vulnerability templates from source code graphs.
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For an exhaustive survey of the variants and use-cases of
machine learning over source code, we refer the reader to a
2018 paper by Allamanis et al. [10].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we explored the possibility of automatically
extracting signatures of software vulnerabilities, in terms of
node connectivity templates over a graph-level representation
of source code. We developed an AI4VA pipeline to classify
C functions as being vulnerable or not, by converting them
into vectorized graph representations while preserving their
structural and semantic information. We trained a state-of-the-
art Gated Graph Neural Network to learn to differentiate the
properties of code graphs of vulnerable functions from their
healthy counterparts. Our model outperformed static analyzers,
classical machine learning, and deep learning approaches in
two of the three datasets we experimented with. On the
third dataset, the performance across the board was not much
better than a coin-toss, prompting us to look into cleaner
real-world datasets with more trustworthy ground truth labels
as part of ongoing work. We also uncovered issues with
combining the differentiating features of synthetic and real-
world code, leading us to suspect if transfer learning from
a high quality synthetic dataset to real world code would be
feasible. Our results indicate a superiority of a code-as-graph
approach to vulnerability detection as compared to treating
code as a photo or a linear sequence as in previous approaches.
We also observed, probably as expected, that vulnerability-
specific models performed better than a global model across
all vulnerabilities.
In addition to looking into alternate means of collecting a
cleaner real-world dataset, other threads of our ongoing work
include:
1) Pinpointing the vulnerable locations in the code (nodes in
the CPG), as well as interpreting the classifier’s decision
process by uncovering the vulnerability templates (node
connectivity in the CPGs) being learnt by it during
training. We have started looking into tracking back
from ‘influencer’ nodes, in terms of which other nodes,
and following which particular edges, did these nodes
accumulate their discerning signals.
2) Manually inspecting the incorrectly classified functions
to understand reasons for mistakes (False Positives /
Negatives). When we manually inspected the functions
which were incorrectly classified in the Draper dataset,
we found it challenging to even manually tag them as
being vulnerable or not. We have thus redirected our focus
to inspecting functions on simpler datasets–Juliet, s-bAbI,
to gain any insights on how the model could be further
improved.
3) Training on graphs of program slices instead of full
source code to reduce noise in data [22].
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